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ABSTRACT
Payment channel networks (PCNs) are viewed as one of the most
promising scalability solutions for cryptocurrencies today [22].
Roughly, PCNs are networks where each node represents a user
and each directed, weighted edge represents funds escrowed on a
blockchain; these funds can be transacted only between the end-
points of the edge. Users efficiently transmit funds from node A to B
by relaying them over a path connecting A to B, as long as each edge
in the path contains enough balance (escrowed funds) to support the
transaction. Whenever a transaction succeeds, the edge weights are
updated accordingly. However, in deployed PCNs, channel balances
(i.e., edge weights) are not revealed to users for privacy reasons;
users know only the initial weights at time 0. Hence, when routing
transactions, users first guess a path, then check if it supports the
transaction. This guess-and-check process dramatically reduces
the success rate of transactions. At the other extreme, knowing
full channel balances can give substantial improvements in success
rate at the expense of privacy. In this work, we study whether a
network can reveal noisy channel balances to trade off privacy for
utility. We show fundamental limits on such a tradeoff, and propose
noise mechanisms that achieve the fundamental limit for a general
class of graph topologies. Our results suggest that in practice, PCNs
should operate either in the low-privacy or low-utility regime; it is
not possible to get large gains in utility by giving up a little privacy,
or large gains in privacy by sacrificing a little utility.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Distributed systems security.
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1 INTRODUCTION
As the adoption of cryptocurrencies grows to unprecedented levels
[4], the scalability limitations of these technologies have become
apparent. For example, Bitcoin today can process up to seven trans-
actions per second with a confirmation latency of hours [12, 29].
For comparison, the Visa network can process tens of thousands
of transactions per second with a confirmation latency of seconds
[26]. This gap raises questions about whether cryptocurrencies
are fundamentally able to support as much traffic as traditional,
centralized solutions.
In response to these challenges, several cryptocurrencies have
turned to a class of scalability solutions called payment channel
networks (PCNs) [22]. The core idea is that instead of committing
every transaction to the blockchain, a separate overlay network
(the PCN) is maintained, in which each node represents a user, and
each edge represents pre-allocated funds that can be efficiently
and quickly transacted between the two endpoints of the edge un-
der a mutual agreement. Critically, those transactions on the PCN
are committed to the blockchain only in periodic batches, which
reduces the frequency with which users must call the (slow, inef-
ficient) blockchain consensus mechanism. Users can send money
to non-adjacent nodes on the PCN by relaying money through in-
termediate nodes on the graph. PCNs are viewed in the blockchain
community as one of the most promising scalability solutions today
[13, 25], and several major cryptocurrencies are staking their long-
term scaling plans on PCNs. Prominent examples include Bitcoin’s
Lightning network [22] and Ethereum’s Raiden network [2].
Despite this excitement, there remain several technical chal-
lenges. Principal among them is a privacy-preserving routing prob-
lem: each time users wish to route a transaction, they must find a
path through the PCN with enough pre-allocated funds to route
the transaction. However, in today’s PCNs, edge balances are not
publicly revealed for privacy reasons, making it difficult to find
such a route reliably. The goal of this paper is to study privacy-
utility tradeoffs that arise in such a PCN transaction routing. Before
defining the problem more precisely, we begin with a brief primer.
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Figure 1: Payment channel network. Alice wants to send 3
tokens to Charlie. Transaction fees are omitted for simplic-
ity.
1.1 Payment Channel Networks (PCNs)
A payment channel is a transaction between two parties that es-
crows currency for use only between those two parties for some
amount of time. For example, Alice and Bob could escrow 4 and
2 tokens, respectively, for the next week. The escrow transaction
is committed to the blockchain to finalize it. Once the channel is
finalized, Alice and Bob can send escrowed funds back and forth
by digitally signing the previous state of the channel and the new
updated transaction. For example, Alice can send 3 of her 4 tokens
to Bob, so that the new channel state is (Alice=1, Bob=5). Once
the parties decide to close the channel, they can commit its final
state through another blockchain transaction. Cryptographic and
incentive-based protections prevent users from stealing funds in
a channel, e.g., by committing an outdated state. Maintaining a
payment channel has an opportunity cost because users must lock
up their funds while the channel is active, and they are not actually
paid until the channel is closed. Hence, it is not practical to expect
users to maintain a channel with every individual with whom they
may ever need to transact.
A payment channel network (PCN) gets around this problem by
setting up a graph of bidirectional payment channels. The key idea
is that if Alice wants to transact with Charlie, but is only connected
to him via Bob, then Bob can act as a relay for Alice’s money, passing
it along to Charlie. Again, cryptographic protections are used to
ensure that Bob does not steal Alice’s relayed money, but he does
receive a small fee as payment for his cooperation. Notice that
if Alice wants to send r tokens to any node in the network, she
must first find a directed path to that node with at least r tokens
on every (directed) edge. For example, in Figure 1, suppose Alice
wants to send r = 3 tokens to Charlie. She has two paths available:
A → B → C and A → D → E → C . However, the edge E → C
has only 2 tokens to send in that direction, so it cannot support
Alice’s transaction. Hence, this transaction fails. Suppose Alice
instead sends her transaction over the first path,A→ B → C . After
her transaction is processed, each of the channels moves r = 3
tokens (plus a small processing fee) from one side of the channel to
the other. Note that one could also packet-switch transactions, so
Alice sends part of her transaction over multiple paths. In today’s
PCNs, this functionality is not yet implemented [1]; however, such
routing schemes can give significant performance enhancements
[10, 15, 21, 24]. Packet-switched routing is beyond our scope.
Our work studies the act of finding a path from source to desti-
nation with sufficient balance to support a transaction. If the full
graph and edge weights were known, finding such a path would
be straightforward (albeit computationally-intensive). However, if
users were given access to instantaneous channel balances of the
whole network, any passive observer could trivially see that, for
instance, r tokens flowed along a path from Alice to Charlie. This
is a serious breach of privacy.
Today’s PCNs do not reveal instantaneous balance information
in an attempt to prevent observers from inferring other users’ trans-
action patterns. Instead, users are given access only to the graph
topology, and the sum of balances in either direction on each chan-
nel, which remains constant for the duration of the channel. Because
of this design decision, PCN users are forced to guess if a given
path has enough balance to support a particular transaction by
attempting to send their transaction over that path. If it fails, the
user tries another path until the transaction either completes or
times out; upon a timeout, the user can instead process her transac-
tion on the blockchain, which is comparatively slow and expensive.
This guess-and-check routing approach uses unnecessary resources
and severely limits the success rates of today’s PCNs [27]. Every
time a user tries to route over a path that will ultimately fail, it
temporarily ties up funds along that path, which cannot be used
by other transactions. Moreover, since users are forced to guess
channel balances, they are more likely to not find any valid path
prior to transaction timeout. Our goal in this work is to understand
whether privacy must always come at such a high cost. In particular,
we consider whether a system could reveal noisy channel balances
in an effort to gracefully trade off privacy for utility.
1.2 Contributions
Our contributions are threefold:
• We theoretically model the routing problem in PCNs and de-
fine distribution-free metrics for privacy and utility. We show
a so-called diagonal upper bound on the privacy-utility trade-
off for these metrics over general graphs and a significant class
of shortest-path transaction routing strategies. We show that
the diagonal bound is tight by designing noise mechanisms that
achieve it.
• The diagonal bound is a somewhat negative result, suggesting
that a good tradeoff is not possible. However, we show that by
relaxing certain assumptions (e.g., the shortest-path routing as-
sumption), we can break the diagonal barrier. Indeed, one can
design noise mechanisms that asymptotically achieve a perfect
privacy-utility tradeoff. However, this comes at the cost of in-
creasingly long paths, i.e., increasingly expensive routing fees.
• We demonstrate through simulation that even if one were to
consider an average-case utility metric (fraction of successful
transactions, or success rate) rather than a worst-case one, the
privacy-success rate tradeoff is still not favorable for shortest-
path routing. We use simulation to uncover real-world effects like
deadlocks, which can occur because of noisy balance information.
Overall, our simulations suggest that trading off privacy for utility
does not give significant gains unless the system operates either
in a low-privacy regime or low-utility regime; today’s PCNs
operate in the low-utility regime.
In sum, our results suggest that PCNs may not be able to provide
utility and privacy simultaneously. Moreover, our theoretical anal-
ysis is conducted under an adversarial model that (a) is passive,
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and (b) does not exploit temporal correlations in transaction pat-
terns. Hence, actual privacy threats are likely even more dire than
our results indicate. PCN system designers may therefore need to
make an explicit choice regarding whether the value of PCNs comes
mainly from their potential for improving performance or privacy,
and choose an operating point accordingly.
2 MODEL
We model the PCN as a graph G(V, E), whereV denotes the par-
ticipating nodes with n = |V|, and E the set of edges, or payment
channels, in the PCN. Each edge (u,v) ∈ E is associated with two
weights, buv and bvu , which denote the balances from u to v and
from v to u, respectively. The capacity of the channel, denoted as
Cuv = buv +bvu , is assumed to be a constant; this models a setting
where the channel remains open for the entire duration of the exper-
iment. Recall that our goal is to release noisy channel balances, so
the true balances may not be equal to the publicly-released channel
balances, which we denote by b˜uv and b˜vu , respectively.
We assume an arbitrary sequence of transactions x1,x2, . . . en-
ters the system sequentially. Each transaction xi has an associated
source s(xi ), destination d(xi ), amount r (xi ), and timestamp t(xi ),
where t(xi ) < t(xi+1) for all i . Each transaction is processed in-
stantaneously at its time-of-arrival timestamp. That is, we do not
account for concurrent transactions. For a path P on the graph, we
use s(P) and d(P) to denote its source and destination, respectively.
At transaction x ’s time of arrival, t(x), the source s(x) chooses a
path P from the network with source s(P) = s(x) and destination
d(P) = d(x), such that P appears to have enough balance according
to the publicly visible balances. That is, ∀(u,v) ∈ P , b˜uv ≥ r (x).
Recall that channel balances are noisy, so a path that appears to
have enough balance may not in reality.
If the path chosen for transaction x does not have enough balance
(i.e.,∃(u,v) ∈ P : buv < r (x)), the transaction fails. In this case, both
the visible channel balances b˜uv and the true channel balances buv
remain unchanged. If the path chosen for transaction x has enough
balance (i.e., ∀(u,v) ∈ P ,buv ≥ r (x)), the transaction succeeds, and
∀(u,v) ∈ P , the true channel balance is updated as buv = buv −r (x)
and bvu = bvu + r (x). The visible channel balances, on the other
hand, are updated according to a noise mechanism (or mechanism).
The noise mechanism is probabilistic and chosen by the system
designer; given an input path P , it outputs a random set of edges
Q ⊆ P such that ∀(u,v) ∈ Q , the public balance b˜uv is updated to
the true new balance, buv . We denote this conditional probability
distribution by D [Q |P].
Notice two things about this model: first, we never update public
balances on edges that were not involved in a transaction, i.e., edges
that are not elements of path P . This modeling choice was made
in part for analytical tractability and in part for practicality; since
nodes anyway must communicate with all relays in P , it is easy
to include an instruction for the noisy balance update. Reaching
other nodes would require additional communication that may
not be practical. Second, note that if an edge is updated, it is only
updated to its true balance—never a noisy version of its balance. One
could additionally impose the condition that after choosing a subset
Q , the noise mechanism updates the balances in Q by different
amounts (not necessarily equal to r (x)); however, as we will discuss
in Section 2.1, our privacy metric only considers adversaries who
aim to identify the source or destination of a transaction—not the
amount. Hence, if an adversary observes any update on an edge,
it knows that edge was involved in the transaction; knowing the
exact amount does not give any more information about the source
or destination. Hence, to maximize utility, we might as well reveal
the full balance update.
2.1 Privacy Metric
Our adversary is an honest-but-curious user that passively observes
the network and tries to infer the source and destination of the first
transaction x to pass through the system; the adversary does not
try to guess the transaction amount r (x). We assume that the initial
public balances are all identical to the real balances, i.e., ∀(u,v) ∈ E,
buv = b˜uv at time 0, and all the balances in the PCN are sufficient
to support x ; hence, this metric is equivalent to considering an
arbitrary transaction x but giving the adversary knowledge of the
true balances shortly before t(x). More precisely, once x has been
processed, the adversary guesses one node v ∈ V with probability
A[v |Q], where A is a randomized adversarial strategy. If v ∈ ∂P ,
where ∂P ≜ {s(P),d(P)}, i.e., if the adversary guesses the source
or destination correctly, it wins. To avoid making assumptions
about the transaction or PCN distribution, we consider a worst-
case metric over both. As shown in (2.1), privacy is defined as the
minimax probability that the adversary makes a wrong estimate:
Π(D) = 1 − sup
A
min
P ∈P
∑
v ∈∂P,Q ⊆P
D [Q |P]A [v |Q]
= 1 − sup
A
min
P ∈P
∑
Q ⊆P
D [Q |P]A [∂P |Q] , (2.1)
where P denotes the set of paths in G. For convenience, we let
A[∂P |Q] denote ∑v ∈∂P A[v |Q].
Notice that A[·|Q] is a probability distribution with event space
V , i.e. the supremum over A is taken in the space
A =
{
A
∀u ∈ V, P ∈ P,Q ⊆ P : A[u |Q] ≥ 0, ∑
v ∈V
A[v |Q] = 1
}
.
So constraint A ∈ A is an intersection of linear constraints. In
addition, the objective of (2.1) is the minimum of finite number of
affine functions of A. Hence, the optimization problem in (2.1) is
equivalent to an LP. Because A is compact, the supremum of the
optimization problem is attained. However, solving this optimiza-
tion is intractable in general, due to the optimization over all the
paths in the PCN. We will show that under certain restrictions, a
solution can be computed efficiently.
2.2 Utility Metric
The performance of a PCN is commonly measured by its success rate,
or the fraction of transactions it successfully processes [18, 23, 24].
However, expected success rate is a complicated function that de-
pends on transaction workloads, graph topology, and initial bal-
ances. Since we wish to avoid making assumptions on these char-
acteristics, we instead consider a simpler notion of utility: how
representative are the observed balances of the true underlying
balances? Specifically, given the true balance of a link, we consider
3
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the probability that the observed balance is equal to the true bal-
ance, which we will refer to as the truthful probability. In general,
this probability for a given PCN still depends on the transaction
workload, as well as parameters like the path length. Hence, we con-
sider a worst-case transaction workload that minimizes the truthful
probability.
To this end, we define the quantity in (2.2) below as the utility
of mechanism D. It equals the minimum probability, over all paths
and edges in paths, of a public edge balance equaling the true edge
balance after a transaction passes through it:
U (D) = min
P ∈P
min
ε ∈P
∑
Q :Q ∋ε,Q ⊆P
D [Q |P] (2.2)
In the proposition below, we show how this notion of utility is
related to the truthful probability.
Proposition 2.1. The truthful probability of any edge given any
value of the true balance is lower bounded by the utilityU (D).
Proof.We focus on a particular edge ε ∈ E. Assume at the current
state, the true and public balances of ε are Bε , B˜ε , respectively.
Define event
Eε ≜ there exists a previous transaction going through ε .
If ¬Eε happens, then P[Bε = B˜ε |¬Eε ] = 1, since both balances
are identical to their initial states, at which time all public balances
are truthful.
If Eε happens, we focus on the state when the last transaction
T−1 on path P ′ involving ε was about to be launched. At this state,
we assume the true and public balances of ε are bε and b˜ε , while
they have been Bε and B˜ε since T−1 was launched, respectively. By
definition of utility,
U (D) ≤
∑
Q :Q ∋ε,Q ⊆P ′
D
[
Q |P ′] = P[B˜ε = Bε |Eε ,T−1].
Since T−1 could be arbitrary, P[B˜ε = Bε |Eε ] ≥ U (D).
To summarize, P[Bε = B˜ε ] ≥ U (D) holds for all ε ∈ E regardless
of previous workload on the network. □
From the proof of Proposition 2.1, we can also see that U (D)
is equal to the truthful probability of an edge ε in the following
scenario: a transaction happens along a path P ′ that contains ε , and
ε and P ′ are the minimizers in the definition of U (D). Therefore,
U (D) fully characterizes the truthful probability in a worst-case
sense. For this reason, we will focus onU (D) as our utility metric.
3 FUNDAMENTAL LIMITS
As system designers, we want the the privacy and utility metrics
defined in (2.1) and (2.2) to be high, i.e., close to 1. In this section,
we show that for an important class of routing algorithms, this is
not possible; additionally, we provide a tight upper bound on the
tradeoff between these quantities.
Let us begin by considering two extreme points. First, consider a
setting with perfect utility,U (D) = 1. To achieve perfect utility, on
every path, the balance of every edge must be truthfully updated.
Hence, if the adversary simply guesses the source of of the observed
updated path, it always wins, so we have no privacy: Π(D) = 0.
Next, consider a case with no utility,U (D) = 0. This implies that
for every path, noise mechanismD always hides the balance update
Figure 2: Example of a path fromA to E and a corresponding
path trace, the set of edges A→ B and C → D.
on at least one edge from the true path. Regardless of the noise
mechanism, the adversary can always pick a node uniformly at
random. Since there aren nodes, it guesses the source or destination
with probability 2/n, so Π(D) ≤ 1 − 2n , ∀D. Hence, we have an
upper bound on the privacy metric at the two extremes of the utility
spectrum.
The more challenging and interesting case arises when 0 ≤
U (D) ≤ 1. We first define a path trace, which intuitively describes a
(possibly disjoint) set of edges that are elements of a path between
two endpoints. This set of edges must include the first and last hop
of the path, adjacent to the two endpoints (Figure 2).
Definition 3.1. Given two nodes x and y on an arbitrary undi-
rected graph (V, E) with set of available paths P, a set of oriented
edges Q is a path trace from x to y, if and only if
(1) x has an incident edge in Q with x being the source;
(2) y has an incident edge in Q with y being the destination;
(3) there exists a path P ∈ P, P ⊇ Q from x to y.
We say x is a source of Q , and y is a destination of Q .
In other words, a path trace is what the adversary sees after the
noise mechanism updates a subset of edges in a given path. A path
trace is always a subset of an available path in P. Our first main
result, Theorem 3.2, states that if P includes only shortest paths
between nodes, then the privacymetric is upper bounded by a linear
relation that we call the diagonal bound. Notice that shortest-path
routing is extremely common. First, today’s PCNs like the Lightning
network implement shortest-path routing by default [1]. Second,
since intermediate relays in PCNs extract transaction fees, shortest-
path routing can be thought of as a proxy for cheapest routing,
which users are incentivized to use. Hence this result applies to the
vast majority of routes used in practice.
Theorem 3.2 (The Diagonal Bound). On a network (V, E,P)
with n = |V| ≥ 2, if P includes only shortest paths, then for any
noise mechanism D, its privacy Π(D) and utilityU (D) satisfy
Π(D) ≤
(
1 − 2
n
)
[1 −U (D)]. (3.1)
Notice that this bound, plotted in Figure 3, does not make as-
sumptions about the structure of the underlying graph. Intuitively,
the result holds because for any observed path trace taken from a
shortest path between two nodes on an arbitrary graph, the adver-
sary can uniquely identify its source and destination. For example,
consider Figure 4 (left). On a tree, even if the noise mechanism
reveals only a subset of edges in a path, the adversary can trivially
4
Privacy-Utility Tradeoffs in Routing Cryptocurrency over Payment Channel Networks Woodstock ’18, June 03–05, 2018, Woodstock, NY
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Utility, U(D)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1 2n
Pr
iv
ac
y,
 
(D
)
n = 20 Nodes on PCN
Diagonal Bound
Tradeoff of DN
Figure 3: The diagonal upper bound of Theorem 3.2, and the
achievable tradeoff for the all-or-nothing scheme. The all-
or-nothing curve is slightly displaced from the upper bound
for greater visibility.
reconstruct the interior path exactly. From this reconstruction, the
endpoints are clear. Notice that in a path trace, we know the orienta-
tion of each edge because a truthfully-updated channel will always
reveal the direction of money flow. In Figure 4 (right), we see that
on a grid graph, the adversary cannot always reconstruct the exact
path, as there may be multiple shortest paths consistent with the
path trace. For instance, the adversary cannot tell if B → C → E
or B → D → E was the true path. However, the adversary can
uniquely determine the set of endpoints of the trace: A and E. Any
other choice (e.g, A and D) that passes through the full set of path
trace edges has a strictly longer path length. This observation is
true for general graphs, allowing the adversary to use the source or
destination of the path trace as its estimate of the source or destina-
tion of the original path. This in turn causes the privacy metric for
a noise mechanism to be governed primarily by its behavior near
the source and destination, giving rise to the diagonal bound.
Figure 4: Examples of a path and a path trace on a 3-regular
tree (left) and a grid graph (right), assuming shortest-path
routing. For a tree, given any path trace, we can always
uniquely determine the path that generated the path trace
(up to the endpoints of the path trace). On a grid graph (in-
deed, on general graphs), we can uniquely determine the
endpoints of the path trace, but not necessarily the full path.
Proof. First, given that all routes are shortest paths, we prove the
claim that there exists a unique pair of source and destination nodes
of any path trace Q ⊆ E. Let δ (u,v) denote the distance between
any pair of nodesu,v on the graph. Assume by contradiction thatQ
is a path trace from x to y, and from z tow , where {x ,y} , {z,w}.
By definition, there exist paths Pzw and Pxy , where
(1) The endpoints of Pzw are z andw ;
(2) The endpoints of Pxy are x and y;
(3) Q is a subset of both Pzw and Pxy .
As a result, both x and y are on path Pzw . Because Pzw is the
shortest path connecting z andw , its segment connecting x and y is
also the shortest path connecting x and y. Since {x ,y} is different
from {z,w}, we have δ (x ,y) < δ (z,w). By the same reasoning, we
get δ (z,w) < δ (x ,y) from z,w belonging to path Pxy , which is a
contradiction. Therefore, any path trace Q ⊆ E with a source has
a unique source. So there exists a function s : 2E − {} → V ,
mapping each path trace to its source. Define s() < V .
To upper bound our privacy metric, we will analyze the privacy
achievable by an adversary with strategy AN, where
(1) If no edge is updated by the noise mechanism, the adversary
guesses randomly, i.e. AN[v |] = 1n for all v ∈ V;
(2) If a set of edges Q ,  is updated, the adversary estimates
its source, i.e. AN[s(Q)|Q] = 1.
Let εs (P) denote the first edge of path P . By our privacy defini-
tion,
Π(D) = 1 − sup
A
min
P ∈P
∑
Q ⊆P
D [Q |P]A [∂P |Q]
≤ 1 − min
P ∈P
∑
Q ⊆P
D [Q |P]AN[∂P |Q]
= 1 − min
P ∈P

2D [|P]
n
+
∑
Q :s(Q )=s(P ),Q ⊆P
D [Q |P]
 , (3.2)
where the last equality comes from splitting the adversary’s proba-
bility of success into random guessing if no edges are updated, plus
the probability of the noise mechanism revealing a path trace that
truthfully reveals the true source edge. Recall thatA [∂P |Q] denotes
the adversary’s probability of guessing one of the endpoints of P
upon observing path trace Q .
Because D[·|P] is a probability distribution, the following con-
straints hold.
D[|P] +
∑
Q :s(Q )=s(P ),Q ⊆P
D[Q |P] ≤ 1;∑
Q :s(Q )=s(P ),Q ⊆P
D[Q |P] =
∑
Q :Q ∋εs (P ),Q ⊆P
D[Q |P] ≥ U (D),
where the latter condition follows from the definition of utility. If
we assume n ≥ 2, it follows that for any P ,
2D [|P]
n
+
∑
Q :s(Q )=s(P ),Q ⊆P
D [Q |P] ≥ 2
n
[1 −U (D)] +U (D).
By substituting it back to (3.2), we obtain
Π(D) ≤ 1 −U (D) − 2
n
[1 −U (D)],
which is equivalent to (3.1). □
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We next prove that the bound in Theorem 3.2 is tight. The proof
of the upper bound implies that hiding edges in the interior of a
path does not improve privacy if one or both of the endpoints of
the path are revealed. In other words, an adversary cannot always
determine the sequence of edges between the endpoints of a path
trace, but it can identify the endpoints of the trace. Because there
is no privacy benefit to hiding interior edges of a path, we should
maximize utility (for a given privacy level) by revealing all interior
edges. This motivates the so-called all-or-nothing noise mechanism.
Definition 3.3. For a transaction routed over path P , the all-or-
nothing noise mechanism DN either truthfully updates balance
on every edge of P with probability U (DN), or updates nothing
with probability 1 −U (DN).
We define a reachable network as follows:
Definition 3.4. A network (V, E,P) is reachable, if for any pair
of nodes (u,v) ∈ V2 with u , v , there exists a path P ∈ P that
goes from u to v , or from v to u.
Lemma 3.5. On a reachable network,
sup
A[· |]
min
P ∈P
A[∂P |] = 2
n
. (3.3)
Proof. Because A[·|] is a probability distribution, for any strat-
egy A, there exists 2 nodes u1,u2 such that
A[u1 |] + A[u2 |] ≤ 2
n
.
By assumption that the network is reachable, there exists a path
Pu connecting u1,u2. Hence,
min
P ∈P
A[∂P |] ≤ A[∂Pu |] ≤ 2
n
, ∀A.
In themeantime, the adversary who guesses each node uniformly
could make the inequality above tight, which proves (3.3). □
On a reachable network, the below theorem characterizes the
privacy-utility tradeoff for the all-or-nothing noise mechanism.
Theorem 3.6. On a reachable network, the privacy-utility tradeoff
of the all-or-nothing noise mechanism is characterized by
Π(DN) =
(
1 − 2
n
)
[1 −U (DN)]. (3.4)
Although this result holds for all reachable networks, regardless
of routing policy, it also implies that the upper bound in Theorem
3.2 is tight for shortest-path routing over reachable networks.
Proof.When the entire path is updated, the adversary A0 may
directly pick an endpoint of the observed path as its estimate. Hence,
sup
A
min
P ′∈P
A[∂P ′ |P ′] = A0[∂P |P] = 1, ∀P ∈ P .
By our privacy definition,
Π(DN) = 1 − sup
A
min
P ∈P
∑
Q ⊆P
DN[Q |P]A[∂P |Q]
= 1 − sup
A
min
P ∈P
{[1 −U (D)]A[∂P |] +U (D)A[∂P |P]}
= [1 −U (D)]
(
1 − sup
A
min
P ∈P
A[∂P |]
)
= [1 −U (D)]
(
1 − 2
n
)
. (*)
Obtained by Lemma 3.5, (*) justifies the original claim. □
The results of this section are not encouraging; they imply that
a perfect privacy-utility tradeoff is impossible as long as nodes use
shortest-path routing. Since there is a monetary cost associated
with taking longer paths, most users are likely to default to shortest-
path routing. Nonetheless, some users do care about privacy and
may be willing to pay for it [3, 5]. The next section explores var-
ious techniques for breaking the diagonal bound, and the costs
associated with doing so.
4 BREAKING THE DIAGONAL BARRIER
The goal of this section is to break the diagonal barrier imposed by
Theorem 3.2 by relaxing the assumptions on which it is based. We
consider two relaxations: one related to adding uncertainty to the
candidate endpoint set, and the other related to adding uncertainty
to the set of candidate paths. More precisely, Theorem 3.2makes two
main assumptions: (i) utilityU (D) is computed as a minimum over
all network edges, as in the definition (2.2), and (ii) all transactions
are routed using a shortest path between the source and destination.
Wewill relax the first assumption to introduce endpoint uncertainty,
and the second to introduce path uncertainty.
Assumption (i): Definition (2.2) of utility may not be appropriate
when the PCN includes endpoint nodes with degree one, or clients
that connect to “gateway" routers. This could happen, for exam-
ple, if PCNs evolve so that merchants run the majority of router
nodes, which maintain several well-funded channels, and end users
connect to merchants only for their own transactions, i.e., without
participating in transaction relaying. As an extreme example, con-
sider a star network, which is a tree of depth one. Any routing of a
transaction requires at most two edges, whose balances are already
known to the nodes directly involved in the transaction, i.e., the
sender and the receiver. Because the sender and receiver already
know the balances on their adjacent edges, they could transmit
this information out of band, so hiding the balance of any edge
does not decrease success rate, but provides perfect privacy against
an external observer. In Section 4.1, we show how to improve the
privacy-utility tradeoff by allowing the source and destination to
exchange their adjacent true balances prior to transacting.
Assumption (ii): The second assumption might not hold if users
are willing to route transactions over paths longer than the shortest
path(s). At the cost of incurring more fees, such longer routing
can intuitively achieve better privacy-utility tradeoff. Although the
gains are difficult to quantify in general, we precisely quantify them
for a special network topology in Section 4.2.
4.1 Endpoint Uncertainty
In real-world PCNs, users know the true balances (or weights) on
their directly adjacent channels (or edges). For example, when a user
Alice tries to transact with neighboring user Bob, Alice and Bob
already know each other’s true balances. Therefore, for any direct
transaction among neighbors, success rate is not sacrificed even if
the balances are kept private. In an extension of this idea, consider a
PCN model with users and servers; users make transactions among
themselves, whereas servers relay them. Servers are connected in a
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network structure (VS , ES ), whereas each user node is connected
to one server node. LetVU , EU denote the set of user nodes and
user-server channels, respectively. Then there exist functions J :
VU →VS andK : VU → EU , where for a user nodev ∈ VU , J (v)
is the server to whichv is connected, andK(v) is its unique incident
channel, which connects v and J (v). Furthermore, let (nS ,nU ) =
(|VS | , |VU |). The public balances on the user-server channels are
never updated, while those on the inter-server channels are updated
with a privatizing noise mechanism of our choice.
Under the following assumption that the set P of available paths
are not too restricted, we show that just privatizing the inter-server
channels is sufficient to achieve improved privacy-utility tradeoff.
Assumption 1. For any oriented path P ∈ P from x to y,
• if x < VS , then P − {(x , J (x))} ∈ P;
• if x ∈ VS , then ∀v : J (v) = x , we have {(v,x)} ∪ P ∈ P);
• if y < VS , then P − {(J (y),y)} ∈ P;
• if y ∈ VS , then ∀v : J (v) = y, we have {(y,v)} ∪ P ∈ P).
Proposition 4.1. Suppose we have a user-server network (VS ∪
VU , ES ∪EU ), and the set P of available paths satisfy Assumption 1,
the server sub-network (VS , ES ) is reachable under P, and all the
transactions are routed via the shortest paths. When the channels
on the server network (VS , ES ) have balances governed by the all-
or-nothing noise mechanism DN with utility U (DN) = α , and the
channels on the user network (VU , EU ) are completely hidden, the
privacy metric Π(DN) is
Π(DN) =
(
1 − 2
nS + nU
)
(1 − α) + µ
µ + 1α , (4.1)
where µ is a lower bound on the number of users attached to any
server node.
Compared with all-or-nothing noise on a full PCN (Theorem 3.6),
the privacy level of the user-server model is higher by µU (D)/(1+µ).
Figure 7, left panel, plots the gains achievable from Theorem 4.1
under all-or-nothing noise. As the number of users per server in-
creases, we get improved tradeoffs, eventually achieving maximum
privacywith no utility loss in the limit as µ,nS ,nU →∞. Intuitively,
the adversary cannot distinguish between sources or destinations
connected to the first and last server nodes. Since the adjacent user
nodes as well as the last server node can all be the real destination
of money flow, the adversary’s best strategy is to guess uniformly
at random. Hence the gain in privacy comes from the increased
uncertainty at the end nodes, which does not sacrifice the success
rate of routing transactions. This observation can be generalized
to each user having multiple connections to servers, as long as the
users do not relay transactions. Moreover, preliminary evidence
suggests that user-server models may naturally emerge in practice;
thus far, we have seen the emergence of routing hubs on the Light-
ning network, complemented by many users with few channels
(Figure 15).
4.1.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1. For path P ∈ P, let P¯ denote P ex-
cluding the user-server channels, if they exist. If the all-or-nothing
noise DN selects "nothing", then the adversary sees no update. Oth-
erwise, the adversary will see P¯ instead of P in our original model
Figure 5: The user-servermodel consists of server nodes that
route transactions, and user nodes who make transactions,
but do not relay other nodes’ transactions.
analyzed in Section 3. By definition of privacy,
Π(DN) = 1 − sup
A
min
P
{
A[∂P |P¯]α + A[∂P |] (1 − α)}
= 1 − sup
A[· |P¯ ],A[· |]
min
P
{
A[∂P |P¯]α + A[∂P |] (1 − α)}
(∗)≤ 1 − sup
A[· |P¯ ],A[· |]
[
α min
P
A[∂P |P¯] + (1 − α)min
P ′
A[∂P ′ |]
]
= 1 − α sup
A[· |P¯ ]
min
P
A[∂P |P¯] − (1 − α) sup
A[· |]
min
P ′
A[∂P ′ |],
where the last line follows because A[·|P] and A[·|] are indepen-
dent. Because the network is reachable, we may apply Lemma 3.5
and obtain
sup
A
min
P ′
A[∂P ′ |] = 2
nS + nU
,
where the adversary reaches the supremum by choosing each
node with equal probability when it sees no balance update.
Now we compute supA minP A[∂P |P¯]. Since P¯ must be a path
between server nodes, we let x ,y denote them and define two sets
X ≜ {x} ∪ {v ∈ VU |J (v) = x} , Y ≜ {y} ∪ {v ∈ VU |J (v) = y} .
If x = y, then the transaction only goes through user-server
channels and P¯ = . The adversary will see no update regardless
of utility α , so random guessing with equal probability is the best
adversarial strategy. Now we assume x , y, and immediately X ∩
Y = . The two endpoints of P must lie in each ofX and Y . Because
A[·|P¯] is a probability distribution, for any A there exists u ∈ X
and v ∈ Y , where
A[u |P¯] + A[v |P¯] ≤ max
{
1
|X | ,
1
|Y |
}
.
By the properties of a user-server model, there exists a path Pu
containing P¯ , and connecting u and v . Hence, we have
sup
A
min
P
A[∂P ′ |P¯ ′] ≤ sup
A
A[∂Pu |P¯] ≤ max
{
1
|X | ,
1
|Y |
}
≤ 1
µ + 1 .
(4.2)
Recall that AS was previously defined as AS[v |Q] = 1/(nS +nU )
for all v ∈ V , if Q = . We supplement this definition by defining
it also in the case Q , . Recall that all-or-nothing noise DN is
being used, and Q must be a shortest path on the server network
(VS , ES ) from x ′ to y′. Similar to X and Y , we use the following
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notations.
X ′ =
{
x ′
}∪{v ∈ VU J (v) = x ′} , Y ′ = {y′}∪{v ∈ VU J (v) = y′} .
Assume Z ′ is the set with fewer elements between X ′ and Y ′.
The strategy AS is defined as followed.
AS[z |Q] =
{ 1
|Z ′ | , if z ∈ Z ′,
0, otherwise.
It can be easily confirmed that AS can make every inequality in
(4.2) tight, thus
sup
A
min
P
A[∂P |P¯] = 1
µ + 1 .
By substituting A = AS in both sides of (*), we also get an
equality. Hence,
Π(DN) = 1 − 1
µ + 1α − (1 − α)
2
nS + nU
,
which proves (4.1). □
Proposition 4.1 holds when each user is allowed to be connected
to only one server. In this case, the size of server sub-network is
limited, since nS ≤ n/(µ + 1). We can easily extend this result to
the case where each user node is allowed to share channels with
multiple server nodes, but users do not relay transactions. In this
case, the network structure will be much more compact, and its
privacy is only slightly worse than (4.1), as seen in the following:
Corollary 4.2. Assume the assumptions of Proposition 4.1 except
that each user may connect to multiple servers (but not relay trans-
actions). The privacy metric Π(DN) of the all-or-nothing noise DN
satisfies
Π(DN) ≥
(
1 − 2
nS + nU
)
(1 − α) + µ
µ + 2α , (4.3)
where µ is a lower bound on the number of user nodes attached to any
server node.
This suggests that in practice, user endpoints can improve their
privacy by not updating their balances without losing any utility, as
long as they have an out-of-band channel of communication with
the recipient of a transaction. This may not always be feasible, e.g.,
in cases where the sender or recipient wishes to remain anonymous.
4.2 Path Uncertainty
The previous subsection showed how a special class of networks
can be exploited to increase user privacy by introducing uncertainty
regarding the endpoints of a path under all-or-nothing noise. In
this section, we explore techniques for obfuscating the transaction
path itself. When users are allowed to use longer paths, the noise
mechanism can hide edges so that path traces do not reveal the
source/destination pair. This is not true under the shortest path
routing as illustrated in Section 3. For the rest of this section, we
consider the special case of a complete graph. Although complete
graphs are not realistic for deployed PCNs, they provide a method
for analyzing the privacy definition LP in (2.1), as well as inspiration
for noise mechanisms that can break the diagonal barrier in Sec. 3.
Definition 4.3. Given the edges on a directed path P , let the odd
edges include the 1st, 3rd, 5th, ... edges and the even group include
Figure 6: A path and path trace for the alternating noise
mechanism; in this case, even edges were revealed.
the 2nd, 4th, 6th, ... edges. The alternating noise mechanismDT
is defined as follows:
• At utility α ∈ [0, 0.5], DT either updates the balances of the odd
edges with probability α , updates balances of the even edges with
same probability, or updates nothing with probability 1 − 2α .
• At utility α ∈ (0.5, 1], DT either updates the balances of the odd
edges with probability 1 − α , updates balances of the even edges
with same probability, or updates nothing with probability 2α −1.
To preserve symmetry, P is assumed to be the set of all simple
paths of fixed length L. Note that it may be computationally infea-
sible to find a simple path of given length that satisfies a balance
constraint in practice. Intuitively, we expect alternating noise to
have good privacy; even when the adversary knows the path length
L, each revealed edge could be the first or last edge, and the graph
topology gives no way to differentiate between edges. For example,
in Figure 6, the adversary is able to discern that the even edges were
revealed since L = 5 and only two edges are revealed. Hence it must
guess the source/destination uniformly from the nodes that are not
part of the path trace. If the odd edges had been revealed, then be-
cause the graph is complete, any ordering of the edges would have
been feasible. Hence, the adversary would need to guess one of the
endpoints of the revealed edges uniformly at random. Combined,
these cases give asymptotically perfect privacy as L,n →∞. The
next theorem characterizes this tradeoff precisely.
Theorem 4.4. Suppose L ≥ 2 and the alternating scheme DT has
utility α = U (DT) and privacy Π(DT). If 2 | L, i.e. L is even, its
privacy-utility tradeoff on a complete graph is characterized by
Π(DT) =

1 − 2
n
−
(
2
min {L,n − L} −
4
n
)
α , 0 ≤ α ≤ 12 ;(
2 − 2min {L,n − L}
)
(1 − α), 12 < α ≤ 1.
(4.4)
If 2 ∤ L, i.e. L is odd, its privacy-utility tradeoff is characterized by
Π(DT) =

1 − 2
n
−
(
2
L + 1 +
2
n − L + 1 −
4
n
)
α , 0 ≤ α ≤ 12 ;(
2 − 2
L + 1 −
2
n − L + 1
)
(1 − α), 12 < α ≤ 1.
(4.5)
This tradeoff is plotted in Figure 7 (right) for two path lengths,
L = 9 and L = 60. Notice that the difference between these curves
is small, even though the difference in path lengths is almost an
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Figure 7: Exploiting the structures of the networks, we can
design mechanisms that overcome the diagonal bound of
Theorem 3.2 (shown in blue dashed line). Under the user-
server model, we exploit endpoint uncertainty and under
the clique model, we exploit path uncertainty.
order of magnitude. Hence, using longer paths appears to have
diminishing returns for alternating noise.
Another natural mechanism which requires less coordination
among the nodes in a path is the i.i.d. noise mechanism.
Definition 4.5. The i.i.d. noise mechanism DI updates the bal-
ance of each edge independently with constant probabilityU (DI).
Mathematically, for a path P with length L,
DI[Q |P] = [U (DI)] |Q |[1 −U (DI)]L−|Q | , ∀Q ⊆ P .
This noise mechanism enjoys similar privacy gains as the alter-
nating mechanism due to path uncertainty. The main difference is
that the number of candidate endpoints is now a random variable.
We characterize the utility/privacy tradeoff precisely below.
Theorem 4.6. Suppose (V, E) is a complete graph and P is the
set of all simple paths of fixed length L. The privacy Π(DI) of i.i.d.
noise mechanism DI on a complete graph is lower bounded by
Π(DI) ≥ 1 − 2(1 − α)
L
n
− 2(L + 1)(1 − α)
[
1 − αL+1 − (1 − α)L+1
]
,
(4.6)
where α = U (DI) is the utility.
Figure 7 (right) plots the achievable bounds of Theorems 4.4 and
4.6, illustrating that neither scheme strictly dominates the other.
However, i.i.d. noise has a larger jump in performance as we move
from paths of length L = 9 to L = 60. Due to space constraints, the
proofs of Theorems 4.4 and 4.6 can be found in Appendix A.
Takeaway Message. In this section, we show that the diagonal
bound can be broken through two techniques: adding endpoint
uncertainty and adding path uncertainty. Our exploration of path
uncertainty in particular is limited to complete graphs due to the
computational complexity of evaluating privacy metric (2.1) on
general graphs. Still, we conjecture that similar intuitions can be
applied to more complex, structured graphs; for instance, we relied
on both the symmetry and the well-connected nature of complete
graphs in our analysis; some circulant graphs exhibit similar prop-
erties. Hence, a takeaway message is that if one has the ability to
choose a network structure, noise mechanism, and routing policy,
it is possible to achieve an improved privacy-utility tradeoff. This
comes at the cost of higher transaction fees due to the choice of rout-
ing through longer paths. On the other hand, the user-server model
arises organically in current payment channels, and is compatible
with cost-effective, shortest-path routing.
5 SIMULATIONS
Success rate is one of the key metrics that system designers want
to maximize; however, due to the complexity of theoretically quan-
tifying success rate, we have analyzed a related quantity (utility) in
this work. In this section, we empirically investigate the tradeoff
between success rate and privacy in simulation. The purpose of
these simulations is twofold: first, we want to understand how the
privacy-utility tradeoffs analyzed earlier translate into a privacy-
success rate tradeoff. Second, we want to understand the effects
of network properties not captured by our analysis, such as graph
topology, transaction workload, and initial capacity distribution.
Our simulator models the sequential processing of a workload:
a sequence of transactions, or tuples consisting of a sender, a re-
ceiver, and a transaction value. To match behavior in real deploy-
ments, each transaction is routed using shortest-path routing on
the weighted graph, where routes are determined from public bal-
ances. A transaction fails if either no route can be found, or if the
user tries a route whose true balances are insufficient to support
the transaction. When a transaction fails, we do not allow retries.
In line with theorems 3.2 and 3.6, we use the all-or-nothing noise
scheme D = DN with optimal privacy-utility tradeoff (3.4). Hence,
after each transaction, we update all path balances with probability
U (DN), drawn independently for each transaction. We compute
success rate by counting the fraction of successfully-processed
transactions. Our theoretical results suggest that one can trade
some privacy for an equal amount of utility. The question is, when
we sacrifice one unit of privacy for one of utility, does this translate
into a gain of more than one unit of success rate?
Privacy-success rate curves depend on many factors, including
the choice of network, workload, noise mechanism, and initial bal-
ance/capacity allocations. For each parameter setting, we generated
100 sets of networks and/or workloads in advance and ran each
workload on its corresponding network, with the appropriate noise
mechanism. We plot the mean success rate and standard error bars.
5.1 Network Structure
Our first set of experiments considers the effects of network struc-
ture on performance. We consider both synthetic and real network
structures. For real network topologies, we use a snapshot of the
Lightning Network and its channel capacities measured on De-
cember 28, 2018. The network consists of 2,266 nodes and 15,392
channels, while channel capacities vary from 1,100 to 16,777,216=
224 satoshis (1 satoshi = 10−8 Bitcoin). For synthetic structures, we
use Erdős-Rényi graph with different sizes and densities, where
for a PCN with n nodes and m channels, density is defined as
2m/[n(n−1)]. We fixed the synthetic network sizes to 2,266 tomatch
the Lightning Network dataset. We evaluated three densities: (a)
low density: ρL(2266), which equals log 2266/2266 ≈ 3.41 × 10−3.
This is the minimum density needed to keep the network con-
nected with high probability. (b) Lightning Network density:
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Figure 8: Success rate-privacy curves on different network
topologies. Success rate is the fraction of successful transac-
tions out of total 3,000.
ρLND(2266) ≈ 6.00 × 10−3. This is the density measured from the
LND dataset, and is calculated given that the number of channels is
15,392. (c) high density: ρH(2266) = 5ρL(2266) ≈ 17.0 × 10−3. We
also explore the effects of varying network size in Appendix B.
Initial balances and transaction workloads are unavailable on
the Lightning Network because it operates in the high privacy
regime. Hence, we chose initial channel capacities according to
the observed capacity distribution, then uniformly allocated the
balances on both ends of each channel. For the transactionworkload,
there is again no canonical dataset available, so we uniformly and
independently drew 2 nodes as the sender and receiver of each
transaction, with transaction values independently following a
Pareto distribution Ψ(1.16, 1000). We chose a Pareto distribution to
make the transaction value distribution heavy-tailed, and selected
parameters corresponding to the Pareto principle. Ψ(β,vm ) has
CDF
F (v) =
[
1 −
[
vm (β − 1)
βv
]β ]
· I
[
v ≥ vm (β − 1)
β
]
.
Random variable V ∼ Ψ(β ,vm ) has mean E[V ] = vm . So our
expected transaction value and channel capacities equal 1,000 sat.
The privacy-success rate tradeoff curves with error bars are
shown in Figure 8. The width of error bars suggests a low standard
error. Notice three trends: First, as privacy level increases, success
rate decreases. This makes intuitive sense, as having less accurate
information about channel balances causes more transactions to
fail due to false positives, where the user believes a path has enough
balance from the public balances, but in reality it does not. However,
we will see in Section 5.2 that this is not always the case. Second,
as density decreases among the ER graphs, success rate appears
to drop. This follows because lower-density graphs have fewer
channels; since we draw each channel capacity i.i.d. from the same
distribution, the total funding of the network is lower in low-density
networks. Our third observation is the main takeaway message of
this plot: for the same density and number of nodes, the LND
topology has a strictly lower success rate than the ER graph.
This appears to follow from the highly asymmetric nature of the
LND graph (Figure 15). The LND network has several very high-
degree nodes, with the remaining nodes generally connecting to
only a few other nodes. This hub-and-spokes-like topology appears
to exacerbate channel imbalance; if a few key channels become
imbalanced, it affects the success rates of the whole network. This
illustrates the value of path diversity in PCNs.
Tradeoffs. Recall that one of our main goals was to understand
if the one-to-one tradeoff of privacy for utility extends to success
rate. Figure 8 suggests that this is not the case. For example, on
the LND curve in Figure 8, if we start at today’s operating point
of perfect privacy, one must decrease privacy by 0.8 to gain 0.1
units of success rate. More generally, the curves in these figures
are convex with low curvature; sacrificing some amount of privacy
gives disproportionately small gains in success rate. This suggests
that system designers must sacrifice significant amounts of privacy
to achieve meaningful improvements in success rate.
5.2 Workload size
We next investigate the role of workload size by varying the num-
ber of transactions in our workload. Figure 9 shows the average
success rate as a function of privacy as we process from 70 to 30,000
transactions. Both subfigures have 100 nodes, and the ER graph has
a density of log(100)/100. More precisely, this experiment revealed
two unexpected phenomena: (1) for all privacy levels (including
zero), success rate decreases as we process more transactions. It
is not obvious a priori why this should happen, as transactions
are generated uniformly at random between nodes; on average,
transaction flows should be balanced. (2) Success rate is not always
monotonically decreasing in the privacy parameter. As we process
higher numbers of transactions, we observe a minimum in in the
success rate-privacy curve at high (< 1) privacy levels. We explore
each of these phenomena separately.
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Figure 9: Transaction workload size vs success rate.
Non-monotonicity of success rate. To understand this phenome-
non more carefully, we ran the same experiment as in Figure 9 on
a single-edge PCN, over 100 experiments. Figure 10 plots the real
channel balances vs the observed ones for this edge as the number
of transactions T grows. Each row represents a different utility
level; utility 0 corresponds to perfect privacy. Notice that over time,
the edge becomes deadlocked. In other words, although the public
balance appears to be concentrated on one side of the channel,
the true balance is concentrated on the other. If this imbalance is
extreme enough, it prevents any transactions from passing through
the channel in either direction. This explains the non-monotonicity
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Figure 10: True vs. public balance for a single-edge PCN.
of Figure 9; at high privacy levels, not only are deadlocks likely to
form, but the transactions that do pass are less likely to reverse the
deadlock by revealing the true channel balances, since the proba-
bility of updating channel balances is low. Hence, once a channel
is deadlocked, it can remain so for a long time. In contrast, at per-
fect privacy, we observe relatively fewer deadlocks because public
channel balances remain forever at their initial values. Notice that
in such a scenario, a deadlock can only form if a channel starts in
an imbalanced state (e.g., 100 tokens on one side, 900 on the other),
but eventually moves most of its balance to the other side. This
event is relatively rare because our channel balances are initialized
uniformly in these experiments.
These deadlocks suggest that sacrificing a little privacy can ac-
tually hurt average success rate in the long term. Hence system
designers should be wary of deploying a noise mechanism that
sacrifices only a little privacy; not only are the gains modest in
theory, they can actually be negative in practice, unless system
designers deal with deadlocks.
Declining success rate over time. The declining success rates are
partially due to the previously-described deadlocks. However, we
observe the phenomenon even at zero privacy, when deadlocks can-
not happen. The reason may be related to the formation of routing
bottlenecks. Suppose a nodev receives many transactions until all of
v’s neighboring channels are imbalanced, with most of the balance
on v’s side of the channel. In such a scenario, nobody can route
through v: funds cannot reach v , so it cannot relay money. Under
randomized transaction workloads like ours, such bottlenecks are
theoretically recurrent; in practice, they can also occur if some
nodes are popular money recipients (e.g., merchants). The only
way to break a bottleneck is for the bottlenecked node(s) to send
their own transactions out of the isolated zone. In a large network,
the likelihood of this happening for a uniform workload is small.
Hence, the system may be bottlenecked for a long time.
5.3 Transaction Value
In the previous experimental settings, the value of every trans-
action followed a Pareto distribution Ψ(1.16, 1000). To study the
curves for different transaction value distributions, we first se-
lected two typical network structures: Lightning Network and
Erdős-Rényi network with the same size and density. We also fixed
the size of the workload to 3,000 transactions. We considered two
properties of transaction values: distribution type and expectation.
The distribution types include the uniform distribution from 0 to
twice the expected value, and 3 different Pareto distributions with
β = 1.1, 1.16, 1.25. Their PDFs are plotted in Figure 14 (Appendix
B). Figure 11 illustrates the privacy-success rate tradeoffs for each
of these experimental settings. Here, the “unbalanced” curve in
the top row refers to our approach for generating the endpoints
of transactions; instead of choosing the source and destination
uniformly, we assign users a weight of 1 with probability 0.8 and
16 with probability 0.2. When generating transactions, we sample
endpoints with probability proportional to their weights. On av-
erage, 20% of the users hold 80% of the weight; this models the
imbalance observed in real financial transactions. These plots show
that when the mean transaction value increases, the success rate
decreases. This is because we are keeping the capacity distribution
fixed, so larger transactions are more likely to fail. Similarly, using
increasingly heavy-tailed Pareto transactions (smaller β) causes
the minimum transaction value to decrease, which increases the
success rate. Although these plots illustrate some trends related to
transaction value distribution, the main takeaway is the fact that for
a variety of transaction value distributions, the slope of the privacy-
success rate curves is shallow. This implies that one cannot trade
small losses in privacy for large gains in success rate, or vice
versa.
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Figure 11: Success rate-privacy tradeoffs for different trans-
action value distributions. The left column considers Pareto-
distributed transactions of different means; the right col-
umn considers different distributions with the same mean.
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6 RELATEDWORK
PCNs have received substantial attention recently from the aca-
demic community. Papers in this space typically focus either on
privacy or on utility. To our knowledge, our work is the first to
explicitly quantify tradeoffs between privacy and utility in PCNs.
On the utility front, papers have primarily focused on improv-
ing the success rates of PCNs. This is typically achieved through
new routing mechanisms, which exploit ideas from the network-
ing literature, such as packet-switched routing, congestion control,
and/or flow control [10, 24]. Our work differs from these papers in
that it assumes source-routed transactions. This decision is made
primarily for analytical tractability; understanding the effects of
packet-switched routing is an important direction for future work.
Other recent utility work has instead focused on related but or-
thogonal issues, such as preventing deadlocks in PCNs [19, 28] and
rebalancing depleted channels [17].
On the privacy front, several papers have explored mechanisms
for privacy-preserving routing, both in the context of PCNs [18, 23]
and in general communication networks [8, 9, 14, 20]. Indeed, onion
routing is used in today’s Lightning network [9]. Some of the PCN-
specific mechanisms were later shown to exhibit worse utility than
the Lightning network [24], though their privacy guarantees are
stronger. There are two key differences between the prior litera-
ture on privacy-preserving PCN routing and our work. First, our
adversary is a passive observer of the information publicly released
to all participants, whereas prior work like [9, 14, 18, 23] considers
a corrupt relay node that is trying to learn the destination of a
transaction. Prior work by Malavolta et al. [19] has studied the no-
tion of passive value privacy, or hiding the amount of a transaction
to a passive external observer; they also study active relationship
anonymity, which aims to hide the participants of a transaction to
an active router. Our model is a combination of these; it considers a
passive observer that wants to infer the endpoints of a transaction;
in our setting, hiding transaction value would be easier than hiding
endpoints. Hence, our adversarial model is weaker than prior work
in the sense that it sees less information than a router node, but
stronger in the sense that encrypting the destination of a transac-
tion does not solve the problem. Note that our results are negative,
so with a stronger active adversary, even worse tradeoffs could
emerge. Second, our privacy problem is fundamentally different
from that addressed in prior work. Because all network participants
must be able to route transactions, encrypting transaction balances
is not a viable solution; statistical noise therefore is a more natural
solution. The most closely related work to ours ([19]) explicitly
does not consider the problem of path selection, focusing instead
on how to execute transactions once a path is selected.
Orthogonal to the privacy preserving PCN protocols studied in
this paper, there are privacy threats in blockchain P2P network-
ing protocols. This was demonstrated in [6] where researchers
successfully linked 30% of Bitcoin users’ public keys to their IP
addresses. Such de-anonymization reveals sensitive financial infor-
mation about the owners of the cryptocurrency. The attack exploits
vulnerabilities in the Bitcoin P2P networking stack, whose privacy
implications are poorly understood. A new protocol for broadcast-
ing transactions [7] is shown to achieve near optimal anonymity
guarantees, at minimal cost to network utility.
Notice that differential privacy (a common statistical privacy
metric) is difficult to implement in our setting [11]. For example,
consider providing ε-local differential privacy on the source of a
transaction [16]. This would require that for any observed path trace
Q and any pair of candidate source nodes u,v ∈ V , it must hold
that P[Q |s(P) = v] ≤ eεP[Q |s(P) = u]. To achieve this condition,
we would need to add noise to edges that are not involved in the
transaction itself; this adds significant overhead, both in terms
of implementation and in terms of added noise. Like differential
privacy, ourmetric is worst-case; however, it does not require hiding
the transaction participants among all nodes in the graph.
7 DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have shown that for an important class of routing
mechanisms (shortest-path routing), it is not possible to obtain a
good privacy-utility tradeoff by releasing noisy channel balances
in PCNs. The diagonal bound places an upper limit on the privacy-
utility tradeoff obtainable in practice, and it is tight for general
graph topologies. Our theoretical results are backed by simulations,
which show that even if one considers a more complex end utility
metric (i.e. success rate), the tradeoff does not improve; in fact,
it appears to worsen in some cases. For example, we observe a
new deadlocking phenomenon, by which channels end up severely
imbalanced in one direction, while the public balances are severely
imbalanced in the other. These deadlocks are impossible to revert
for a transaction distribution with a minimum transaction value,
such as the Pareto distributions used in our simulations. In practice,
the situation may not be so dire; small transactions may be able to
prevent the formation of total deadlocks. Another key observation
is that our privacy analysis considers a passive adversary. An active
adversary, which is stronger, could cause these tradeoffs to degrade.
Our findings suggest that network operators may not want to
introduce noisy balance reporting mechanisms to trade off privacy
for utility. Starting from today’s operating point of perfect privacy,
a network would need to give up almost all privacy to obtain sub-
stantial gains in success rate. As long as users use shortest-path
routing, network operators may be better off choosing one extreme
operating point or the other: perfect utility or perfect privacy.
Despite these pessimistic conclusions, our analysis does not close
the book on this issue. It may be possible to obtain a more promising
tradeoff by modeling the effects of concurrent transactions and
packet-switched routing, where transactions are split into smaller
units and sent over different paths. Packet-switched routing can
cause transactions to flow over a much larger fraction of network
edges per transaction. This may have a similar effect to the long-
path analysis in Section 4.2 of confusing the adversary regarding the
endpoints of the transaction. Analyzing such routing mechanisms
is an important and interesting question for future work.
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APPENDIX
A PROOFS
We include proofs of the main results in this section.
A.1 Proof of Proposition 4.2
For path P ∈ P, let P¯ denote P excluding the user-server channels,
if they exist. Furthermore, let Q = {P¯ P ∈ P}. By definition of
privacy,
Π(DN)
= 1 − sup
A
min
P
{
A[∂P |P¯]α + A[∂P |] (1 − α)}
= 1 − sup
A[· |¬],A[· |]
min
P
{
A[∂P |P¯]α + A[∂P |] (1 − α)}
(∗)≤ 1 − sup
A[· |¬],A[· |]
[
α min
P
A[∂P |P¯] + (1 − α)min
P ′
A[∂P ′ |]
]
= 1 − α sup
A[· |¬]
min
P
A[∂P |P¯] − (1 − α) sup
A
min
P ′
A[∂P ′ |]
= 1 − α sup
A[· |¬]
min
P
A[∂P |P¯] − 2
n
(1 − α)
= 1 − 2
n
(1 − α) − α min
Q ∈Q
sup
A[· |Q ]
min
P :P¯=Q
A[∂P |Q]. (**)
Note that by Lemma 3.5, supA minP ′ A[∂P ′ |] = 2/n. Any ad-
versarial strategy can achieve this supremum by guessing uniformly
at random when seeing no updates.
For a server node v , we define its cloud Cv as below.
Cv = {v} ∪ {u ∈ VU |(u,v) ∈ EU } .
Apparently, for all v ∈ ES , |Cv | ≥ µ + 1. Let x ,y ∈ VS where
x , y. Since Cx and Cy are not disjoint anymore, we define
Z = Cx ∩Cy , X = Cx − Z , Y = Cy − Z .
Apparently, X ,Y and Z are disjoint subsets with union Cx ∪Cy .
In addition, x ∈ X , y ∈ Y . For now, we assume |Z | ≥ 2, so that
there exists a path whose both source and destination belong to Z .
Because the network is reachable, there exists a path Q on the
server network (VS , ES ) connecting x and y. In addition, for any
x ′ ∈ Cx and y′ ∈ Cy where x ′ , y′, there exists a path P with
endpoints x ′,y′, and containing Q . In this case, we have
min
P
AS[∂P |Q] = min {pX + pY ,pX + pZ ,pY + pZ , 2pZ } ,
where forW ∈ {X ,Y ,Z }, pW ≜ minv ∈W AS[v |Q]. Now obviously,
the best adversary AS satisfies for all x ′ ∈ X , y′ ∈ Y , z′ ∈ Z ,
(AS[x ′ |Q], AS[y′ |Q], AS[z′ |Q]) ≡ (pX , pY ,pZ ) .
Hence, to obtain AS[·|Q], we only need to determine the proba-
bilities pX ,pY and pZ by solving the following problem.
maximize min {pX + pY , pY + pZ , pZ + pX , 2pZ }
subject to |X | pX + |Y | pY + |Z | pZ = 1. (A.1)
In order to deal with the minimum in the objective function, we
discuss 4 cases.
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Case 1: pZ ≤ pX ,pY . The objective function equals 2pZ , and
2pZ ≤ 2 (|X | pX + |Y | pY + |Z | pZ )|X | + |Y | + |Z | =
2
|X | + |Y | + |Z | .
By taking pX = pY = pZ = 2/(|X | + |Y | + |Z |), the upper bound
is attained. So in this case the maximum equals 2/(|X | + |Y | + |Z |).
Case 2: pZ ≥ pX ,pY . The objective function equals pX + pY .
• If | |X | − |Y | | ≤ |Z |, we let t = (|Y | − |X | + |Z |) /(2 |Z |),
which lies in [0, 1]. Then,
1 = |X | pX + |Y | pY + |Z | pZ
≥ (|X | + t |Z |)pX + [|Y | + (1 − t) |Z |]pY
=
|X | + |Y | + |Z |
2 (pX + pY ) .
So the maximum equals 2/(|X |+ |Y |+ |Z |), which is attained
by taking pX = pY = pZ = 2/(|X | + |Y | + |Z |).
• If |Y | > |X | + |Z |, we have
1 = |X | pX + |Y | pY + |Z | pZ
≥ (|X | + |Z |)pX + (|X | + |Z |)pY .
The maximum equals 1/(|X | + |Z |), which is attained by
taking pY = 0 and pX = pZ = 1/(|X | + |Z |).
• If |X | > |Y |+ |Z |, analogously, the maximum equals 1/(|Y |+
|Z |) with maximizers pX = 0 and pY = pZ = 1/(|Y | + |Z |).
To summarize, the maximum equals
max
{
2
|X | + |Y | + |Z | ,
1
|X | + |Z | ,
1
|Y | + |Z |
}
.
Case 3: pX ≤ pZ ≤ pY . The objective function equals pX + pZ .
• If |X | > |Y | + |Z |,
1 = |X | pX + |Y | pY + |Z | pZ
≥ (|Y | + |Z |)pX + |Y | pZ + |Z | pZ .
This indicates maximum of pX + pZ equals 1/(|Y | + |Z |) by
picking pX = 0 and pY = pZ = 1/(|Y | + |Z |).
• If |X | ≤ |Y | + |Z |,
1 = |X | pX + |Y | pY + |Z | pZ
≥ |X | pX + (|Y | + |Z |)pZ
≥ |X | + |Y | + |Z |2 (pX + pZ ) .
The last line is obtained by using Chebyshev’s inequality,
with conditions |X | ≤ |Y | + |Z | and pX ≤ pZ . So the maxi-
mum of pX +pZ equals 2/(|X | + |Y | + |Z |), which is attained
at pX = pY = pZ = 1/(|X | + |Y | + |Z |).
To summarize, the maximum equals
max
{
2
|X | + |Y | + |Z | ,
1
|Y | + |Z |
}
.
Case 4: pY ≤ pZ ≤ pX . Analogously, the maximum equals
max
{
2
|X | + |Y | + |Z | ,
1
|X | + |Z |
}
.
In general, the maximum may be simply expressed as below.
sup
A[· |Q ]
min
P
A[∂P |Q] = max
{
2
|X | + |Y | + |Z | ,
1
|X | + |Z | ,
1
|Y | + |Z |
}
.
(A.2)
To attain it, the optimal adversarial strategy AS satisfies
(1) if | |X | − |Y | | ≤ |Z |, then for all v ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z , AS[v |Q] =
1/(|X | + |Y | + |Z |);
(2) if |X | > |Y | + |Z |, then for all x ′ ∈ X and v ∈ Y ∪ Z ,
AS[x ′ |Q] = 0, AS[v |Q] = 1/(|Y | + |Z |);
(3) if |Y | > |X | + |Z |, then for all y′ ∈ Y and v ∈ X ∪ Z ,
AS[y′ |Q] = 0, AS[v |Q] = 1/(|X | + |Z |).
It should be addressed that the above solution applies only when
|Z | ≥ 2. For the case |Z | = 0, we have Cx ∩Cy =  equivalently.
Proof of Proposition 4.1 has shown that the maximum value and
the optimal strategy are actually compatible with (A.2). Hence, we
only need to focus on the case |Z | = 1. The analysis begins to fork
at the problem formulation, because there will be no path with both
ends lying in set Z . So we need to modify (A.1) as followed.
maximize min {pX + pY , pY + pZ , pZ + pX }
subject to |X | pX + |Y | pY + |Z | pZ = 1. (A.3)
After similar discussions, we can obtain the maximum
max
{
2
|X | + |Y | + |Z | ,
1
|X | + |Z | ,
1
|Y | + |Z | ,
1
|X | + |Y |
}
.
Because |Z | = 1 ≤ |X | , |Y |, both (A.2) and AS apply to this case.
So we may regard them as a general solution, without respect to
the value of |Z |. Recalling µ is the minimum number of user nodes
connected to any server,
max
{
2
|X | + |Y | + |Z | ,
1
|X | + |Z | ,
1
|Y | + |Z |
}
= max
{
2Cx ∪Cy  , 1|Cx | , 1Cy 
}
≤ max
{
2
µ + 2 ,
1
µ + 1 ,
1
µ + 1
}
=
2
µ + 2 .
Now we go back to privacy. It’s easy to confirm that by substi-
tuting the supremum over A with AS at both sides of (*), it turns
into an equality. Following (**),
Π(DN) = 1 − 2
n
(1 − α) − α min
Q ∈Q
sup
A[· |Q ]
min
P :P¯=Q
A[∂P |Q]
≥ 1 − 2
n
(1 − α) − α min
Q ∈Q
2
µ + 2
=
(
1 − 2
n
)
(1 − α) + µ
µ + 2α .
So the lower bound of privacy is justified. □
A.2 Proof of Theorem 4.4
Let ℓ = ⌊L/2⌋. Let P¯1 and P¯2 denote the "odd" group and "even"
group of path P , respectively. We define
Qi ≜
{
P¯i
P ∈ P} , i ∈ {1, 2} ,
Z (v,Q) ≜ {P v ∈ ∂P , Q ∈ {P¯1, P¯2}} .
The method to analyse Z (v,Q) depends on the parity of L.
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Case 1: When 2 | L, we have Q1 = Q2 (because the graph is
complete). For convenience and consistency, we introduce some
terminology that will be reused in the proof of Theorem 4.6. For
any path trace Q of P , it consists of several disconnected segments,
where each segment consists of one or more edges connected end
to end (in the alternating noise scheme, each segment is only one
edge). Each segment has two end nodes and zero or more inter-
mediate nodes. We call the end nodes of a segment gray nodes,
and the intermediate nodes are called white nodes. Again, in the
alternating noise scheme, there are no white nodes; we will use
white nodes in the proof of Theorem 4.6. The rest of the nodes in the
network are called black nodes. Expressing these as sets, we let
дQ ,wQ and bQ denote the sets of gray, white and black nodes given
path trace Q . An example of segments and the aforementioned
colors are shown in Figure 12.
For any path P under the alternating noise scheme, both P¯1 and
P¯2 yield L = 2ℓ gray nodes and 1 black node. All nodes not on path
P are always black nodes. If a gray node v is determined to be one
endpoint of P , then its status as a source or destination is determined
too. In that case, the other end must be a black node. So Z (v,Q)
equals the number of ways to pick this black node, multiplied by
the number of ways to permute the remaining ℓ − 1 segments. If
a black node v is determined to be one end, it could be either a
source or a destination. Then, Z (v,Q) equals the number of ways
to permute all ℓ segments, multiplied by 2, the number of ways to
determine which end v is. That is,
Z (v,Q) =
{ (ℓ − 1)!(n − 2ℓ), v ∈ дQ ;
2ℓ!, v ∈ bQ .
Case 2: When 2 ∤ L, the case is different because for all Q ∈ Q1,
Q has ℓ + 1 edges, while for all Q ∈ Q2, Q has ℓ edges. As a result,
Q1 ∩ Q2 = . For all Q ∈ Q1,
Z (v,Q) =
{
ℓ!, v ∈ дQ ;
0, v ∈ bQ .
For all Q ∈ Q2,
Z (v,Q) =
{
0, v ∈ дQ ;
2ℓ!(n − 2ℓ − 1), v ∈ bQ .
Define adversarial strategy AT as below. Note that AT[v |] =
1/n for all v ∈ V . If balance updates of the entire path P are visible,
AT directly picks an end node of it, so for all P ∈ P, AT[∂P |P] = 1.
(1) When 2 | L,
AT[v |Q] =

I[2L < n]
L
+
I[2L = n]
n
, v ∈ дQ ;
I[2L = n]
n
+
I[2L > n]
n − L , v ∈ bQ .
(2) When 2 ∤ L,
AT[v |Q] =

I[Q ∈ Q1]
L + 1 , v ∈ дQ ;
I[Q ∈ Q2]
n − L + 1 , v ∈ bQ .
Based on calculations of Z (v,Q), it’s easy to confirm that
AT[·|Q] ∈ argsup
A[· |Q ]
∑
v ∈V
A[v |Q]Z (v,Q), ∀Q ∈ Q1 ∪ Q2.
Now we analyse privacy based on the following discussions.
(1) When α ≤ 1/2,
1 − Π(DT)
= sup
A
inf
P ∈P
{
αA[∂P |P¯1] + αA[∂P |P¯2] + (1 − 2α)A[∂P |]
}
= α sup
A
inf
P ∈P
{
A[∂P |P¯1] + A[∂P |P¯2]
}
+
2 − 4α
n
(A.4)
(†)≤ α|P | supA
∑
P ∈P
{
A[∂P |P¯1] + A[∂P |P¯2]
}
+
2 − 4α
n
=
α
|P | supA
∑
Q ∈Q1∪Q2
∑
v ∈V
A[v |Q]Z (v,Q) + 2 − 4α
n
.
Note that (A.4) is obtained by Lemma 3.5, where AT[·|]
achieves the supremum. If we plugA = AT into both sides of
(†) by replacing the supremum,we get an equality. Hence, the
left side supremum of (†) is also achieved by AT. Therefore,
we can calculate Π(DT) as followed.
(a) When 2 | L, let P ∈ P be arbitrary. In this case, both P¯1
and P¯2 have a gray end node and a black end node. Hence,
Π(DT)
= 1 − α (AT[∂P |P¯1] + AT[∂P |P¯2]) − 2 − 4αn
= 1 + 4α − 2
n
− 2α
(
I[2L < n]
L
+ 2 I[2L = n]
n
+
I[2L > n]
n − L
)
= 1 − 2
n
−
(
2
min {L,n − L} −
4
n
)
α .
(b) When 2 ∤ L, let P ∈ P be arbitrary. Both end nodes are
gray for P¯1 and black for P¯2. Hence,
Π(DT) = 1 − α
(
AT[∂P |P¯1] + AT[∂P |P¯2]
) − 2 − 4α
n
= 1 + 4α − 2
n
− α
(
2I[P¯1 ∈ Q1]
L + 1 +
2I[P¯2 ∈ Q2]
n − L + 1
)
= 1 − 2
n
−
(
2
L + 1 +
2
n − L + 1 −
4
n
)
α .
(2) When α > 1/2, with probability (2α − 1), public balances of
P are updated. Hence,
Π(DT)
= 1 − sup
A
min
P ∈P
{(1 − α)AT[∂P |P¯1] + (1 − α)AT[∂P |P¯2]+
(2α − 1)AT[∂P |P]
}
= 1 − (2α − 1) − (1 − α) sup
A
min
P ∈P
{
AT[∂P |P¯1] + AT[∂P |P¯2]
}
.
Note that the supremum has been solved in the case α ≤ 1/2.
So the results will be written below directly.
(a) When 2 | L,
Π(DT) = (1 − α)
(
2 − 2min {L,n − L}
)
.
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Figure 12: A path and its path trace for i.i.d. noise. Gray
nodes are the endpoints of a revealed segment; white nodes
are internal to a revealed segment; black nodes are not adja-
cent to any revealed edge.
(b) When 2 ∤ L,
Π(DT) = (1 − α)
(
2 − 2
L + 1 −
2
n − L + 1
)
.
The tradeoffs have been proved by the discussions above. □
A.3 Proof of Theorem 4.6
Let λ = L + 1 denote the number of nodes in the path. Define
Q ≜ ⋃P ∈P 2P , where 2S denotes the class of subset of an arbitrary
set S . Notice that the adversarial strategy A has only one constraint
– for everyQ ∈ Q,A[·|Q] is a probability distribution overV , while
A[·|Q1] is independent with A[·|Q2] for Q1 , Q2. Hence, we can
divideA into many separate distributions with a small sample space
V .
Beginning with definition of privacy, we use a trick of comparing
minimum and mean.
Π(DI) = 1 − sup
A
min
P ∈P
∑
Q ⊆P
A[∂P |Q]DI[Q |P]
≥ 1 − sup
A
1
|P |
∑
P ∈P
∑
Q ⊆P
A[∂P |Q]DI[Q |P] (A.5)
= 1 − 1|P | supA
∑
Q ∈Q
α |Q |(1 − α)L−|Q |
∑
P ∈P,P ⊃Q
A[∂P |Q]
≜ 1 −
∑
Q ∈Q
(n − λ)!α |Q |(1 − α)L−|Q |
n! ·
sup
A[· |Q ]
∑
v ∈V
A[v |Q]Z (v,Q).
(A.6)
(A.6) endedwith substitutionZ (v,Q) = |{P ∈ P|Q ⊆ P ,v ∈ ∂P}|.
Since Q is a path trace of P , it consists of several disconnected seg-
ments, where each segment consists of one ormore edges connected
end to end. Intuitively, a segment has two end nodes and zero or
more intermediate nodes. The end nodes of segments are called
gray nodes, and the intermediate nodes are called white nodes.
The rest of the nodes in the network are called black nodes. Ex-
pressing these as sets, we let дQ ,wQ and bQ denote the sets of gray,
white and black nodes given path traceQ . An example of segments
and the aforementioned colors are shown in Figure 12.
The colors of nodes are decided by Q consisting of disconnected
segments. Assume Q has hQ ≥ 1 segments. Furthermore, let kQ
denote the number of internal black nodes, i.e. the black nodes
on the original path. Relatively, external black nodes are the nodes
out of the original path. Now the number of white nodes equals
λ − 2hQ − kQ and that of external black nodes equals n − λ. The
value of Z (v,Q) is discussed based on the color of v .
(1) If v is a white node, it could never be an end node of a path,
so Z (v,Q) = 0 for all v ∈ wQ .
(2) If v is a gray node, we first deal with the case that v is a
source node of some segment σ0, where the other segments
are denoted by σ1 through σhQ−1. Each original path with
source nodev has a permutation of the rest L nodes, which is
uniquely mapped to a combination of the following options.
• Order of segments on the path. There are (hQ − 1)! ways
to permute q1 through qn−1.
• Distribution of black nodes in the gaps between consec-
utive segments, or in the extension of the last segment.
There are
(
hQ + kQ − 1
kQ
)
different ways to distribute the
slots for black nodes.
• Permutation of black nodes filling into the slots. With-
out regard of the position of the slots, there are (n − λ +
kQ )!/(n − λ)! different permutations.
These options are independent of each other, so the multi-
plication rule applies. The analysis for v being a destination
node of a segment is identical. It follows that for all v ∈ дQ ,
Z (v,Q) = (hQ + kQ − 1)!(n − λ + kQ )!
kQ !(n − λ)! . (A.7)
(3) If v is a black node, we must assume kQ ≥ 1. We first deal
with the case that v is a source node of the path. Similarly
we discuss the following options.
• Order of segments. There are hQ ! different orders.
• Distribution of the remaining kQ − 1 slots for black nodes.
There are
(
hQ + kQ − 1
kQ − 1
)
different distributions.
• Permutation of black nodes filling into the slots. There are
(n − λ + kQ − 1)!/(n − λ)! different permutations.
The analysis for v being a destination node is identical. Con-
sidering v could be both source nodes and a destination
nodes of different paths, for all v ∈ bQ ,
Z (v,Q) =

2(hQ + kQ − 1)!(n − λ + kQ − 1)!
(kQ − 1)!(n − λ)! , kQ ≥ 1;
0, kQ = 0.
(A.8)
Z (v,Q) depends only on the color of v , i.e. the set v belongs to.
We may use Zд(Q) and Zb (Q) to denote Z (v,Q) for an arbitrary
v ∈ дQ and v ∈ bQ , respectively. Starting with the LP in (A.6),
sup
A[· |Q ]
∑
v ∈V
A[v |Q]Z (v,Q)
= sup
A[· |Q ]
Zд(Q)
∑
u ∈дQ
A[u |Q] + Zb (Q)
∑
v ∈bQ
A[v |Q]

= max
{
Zд(Q), Zb (Q)
}
=
(hQ + kQ − 1)!(n − λ + kQ )!
(n − λ)!kQ ! ψ (kQ ),
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where
ψ (kQ ) =
{
1, kQ ≤ n − λ;
2kQ
n−λ+kQ , otherwise.
One of the maximizers AI of the LP could be written as
AI[v |Q] =

I[v ∈ дQ ]
2hQ
, kQ ≤ n − λ;
I[v ∈ bQ ]
n − λ + kQ , otherwise.
Explicitly, when the adversary sees balance updates on path trace
Q , it picks a color from gray and black, and randomly chooses a node
of that color. The choice of color depends on whether kQ ≤ n − λ.
Recall that kQ is the number of internal black nodes, and n − λ is
the number of external black nodes.
Let f (A, P) ≜ ∑Q ⊆P A[∂P |Q]DI[Q |P]. Based on the symmetry
of AI, it’s easy to confirm that when substituting the supremum
over A with AI in (A.5), it will make the inequality tight. Let U
denote the uniform distribution over P. Now we obtain
sup
A
min
P ∈P
f (A, P) ≤ sup
A
E
P∼U f (A, P)
= E
P∼U f (AI, P) = minP ∈P f (AI, P)
≤ sup
A
min
P ∈P
f (A, P).
Hence, (A.5) is actually an equality, and
AI ∈ argsup
A
min
P ∈P
∑
Q ⊆P
A[∂P |Q]DI[Q |P].
This means AI is an optimal adversarial strategy for i.i.d. noise
DI and current routing scheme. The proof will be wrapped up
with a final computation of Π(DI) based on the optimal AI. Since
minP ∈P f (AI, P) = EP∼U f (AI, P), for an arbitrary P ′ ∈ P,
min
P ∈P
f (AI, P) = f (AI, P ′).
Immediately,
Π(DI) = 1 −
∑
Q ⊆P ′
α |Q |(1 − α)L−|Q |AI[∂P ′ |Q]. (A.9)
Let vs and vd denote the source and destination of path P ′,
respectively. For a particular Q with h ≥ 1 segments and k internal
black nodes, we have |Q | = λ −h − k . Now we discuss the colors of
vs and vd , depending on Q .
(1) If both are black, then
AI[vs |Q] = AI[vd |Q] =
I[k > n − λ]
n − λ + k .
Because the path is given, the number of path traces with
both black ends equals the number of arrangements of slots
for black nodes and white nodes. In this case, there are h + 1
gaps for k − 2 black nodes, and h gaps for λ − 2h − k white
nodes. Hence,{Q ⊆ P vs ,vd ∈ bQ } = (h + k − 2k − 2 ) (λ − h − k − 1h − 1 ) .
(2) If vs is black and vd is gray, then
AI[vs |Q] = I[k > n − λ]
n − λ + k , AI[vd |Q] =
I[k ≤ n − λ]
2h .
Similarly, we find the number of path traces Q by finding
the number of ways to put k − 1 slots of black nodes into h
gaps, and λ − 2h − k slots of white nodes into h gaps. Hence,{Q ⊆ P vs ∈ bQ ,vd ∈ дQ } = (h + k − 2k − 1 ) (λ − h − k − 1h − 1 ) .
(3) If vs is gray and vd is black, by symmetry,
AI[vs |Q] = I[k ≤ n − λ]2h , AI[vd |Q] =
I[k > n − λ]
n − λ + k ,{Q ⊆ P vs ∈ дQ ,vd ∈ bQ } = (h + k − 2k − 1 ) (λ − h − k − 1h − 1 ) .
(4) If both are gray, then
AI[vs |Q] = AI[vd |Q] =
I[k ≤ n − λ]
2h ,{Q ⊆ P vs ∈ дQ ,vd ∈ bQ } = (h + k − 2k ) (λ − h − k − 1h − 1 ) .
The case k < 2 is not specified as
(
M
N
)
= 0 whenM < 0 ≤ N .
After the above discussion, we may conclude that for a particular
Q , its term in the summation depends only on its h, k and the color
of vS and vd . Therefore, the 2λ terms in the original summation
(A.9) is merged into Poly(n) terms as below.
1 − Π(DI) − 2(1 − α)
L
n
=
⌊λ/2⌋∑
h=1
λ−2h∑
k=0
αλ−h−k (1 − α)h+k−1 ·
(
λ − h − k − 1
h − 1
)
· 2·{ (
h + k − 2
k − 2
)
I[k > n − λ]
n − λ + k
+
(
h + k − 2
k − 1
) [
I[k > n − λ]
n − λ + k +
I[k ≤ n − λ]
2h
]
+
(
h + k − 2
k
)
I[k ≤ n − λ]
2h
}
=
⌊λ/2⌋∑
h=1
λ−2h∑
k=0
αλ−h−k (1 − α)h+k−1 ·
(
λ − h − k − 1
h − 1
)
· 2·{ (
h + k − 1
k − 1
)
I[k > n − λ]
n − λ + k +
(
h + k − 1
k
)
I[k ≤ n − λ]
2h
}
=
⌊λ/2⌋∑
h=1
λ−2h∑
k=0
αλ−h−k (1 − α)h+k−1
(
λ − h − k − 1
h − 1
)
ψ (k)
h + k
(
h + k
h
)
=
λ−1∑
t=1
αλ−t (1 − α)t−1
t
min{t,λ−t }∑
h=1
(
t
t − h
) (
λ − t − 1
h − 1
)
ψ (t − h).
(A.10)
(A.10) is the polynomial-time algorithm of computing Π(DI).
The tradeoff relationships of different settings of (n, λ) is shown in
Figure 7. Because of ψ (t − h), the summation above is difficult to
simplify. Thus, we applyψ (t − h) ≤ 2 and provide a lower bound
for privacy metric.
1 − Π(D) − 2(1 − α)
L
n
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≤ 2
λ−1∑
t=1
αλ−t (1 − α)t−1
t
min{t,λ−t }∑
h=1
(
t
t − h
) (
λ − t − 1
h − 1
)
= 2
λ−1∑
t=1
αλ−t (1 − α)t−1
t
(
λ − 1
t − 1
)
=
2
λ
λ−1∑
t=1
αλ−t (1 − α)t−1
(
λ
t
)
=
2
λ(1 − α)
[
1 − αλ − (1 − α)λ
]
.
The lower bound in (4.6) is justified. □
B SIMULATION RESULTS
To observe the effects of network size, the source and destination of
each transaction are still drawn uniformly, and the values of trans-
actions still follow Pareto distribution Ψ(1.16, 1000). To generate
smaller versions of the Lightning network, we snowball sample the
full-sized graph until reaching the desired size. For each network
size, we sample 100 networks, and the average density of both
Erdős-Rényi and LND networks are matched.
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Figure 13: Privacy-Success rate tradeoff curves for different
graph sizes.
The tradeoff curves are shown in Figure 13. When the size is
small, there is high variance in network topology of LND, which
leads to high variance in success rates. As the network size in-
creases, the privacy-success rate tradeoff becomes insensitive to
these variations. Moreover, we observe that success rate increases.
This may be becase as more nodes are added, there are more paths
for transactions to traverse, which gives additional robustness to
link imbalance.
B.1 Data distributions and workloads
Figure 14 illustrates the pdfs of the Pareto distributions used in
our experiments. Notice that Pareto distributions have a minimum
transaction value, and are also heavy-tailed.
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Figure 14: Pareto distribution pdfs for different parameter
settings.
Our experiments use a snapshot of the real Lightning network
topology, illustrated in Figure 15. The graph has many nodes of
degree 1 or 2, with several large hubs that are well-connected. This
is qualitatively different from the synthetic ER graphs we also used
in experiments.
Figure 15: Snapshot of the Lightning network topology from
December 28, 2018. Node sizes are scaled proportionally to
their degree in the graph.
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